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Abstract 
Procedural consolidation aims to provide a solution for multinational corporate groups 
to achieve the goals of preservation group value and certainty. This article explores the 
desirability of procedural consolidation in the light of multinational enterprises theories, 
in particular, through the lens of business network perspective. It argues that there is an 
inherent difficulty to balance the goal of preservation of group value and the goal of 
certainty by procedural consolidation. This is due to the fact that multinational corporate 
groups achieve an important part of group value by means of spreading head office 
functions across the group; pulling subsidiaries into one insolvency jurisdiction will 
either destroy such value or disrespect the current insolvency jurisdiction rule. 
1. Introduction
When some subsidiaries in one multinational corporate group (Hereafter MCGs) face 
financial difficulties, the other subsidiaries in other member states will also 
suffer.1Procedural consolidation is a way to facilitate the insolvency of MCGs by 
allowing the insolvency proceedings of foreign companies in the same groups to open in 
one national court. The rationale underpinning procedural consolidation is to preserve 
the value of corporate groups as one economic integration and reduce the cost of 
* daoningzhang@gmail.com
1Commission staff working document executive summary of the impact assessment- accompanying the 
document-commission recommendation on a new approach to business failure and insolvency SWD(2014) 
62 final p2 
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multiple insolvency proceedings that would otherwise incur. Also, both corporate rescue 
law theory and cross-border insolvency law theories embrace the value of certainty. 
Procedural consolidation therefore needs to provide a good balance of these values. 
To make procedural consolidation happen, there are two possible ways. One radical way 
is by free choice of insolvency law, which is almost impossible due to its serious 
drawbacks. Another conduit is by means of insolvency jurisdiction rules; it entails one 
court having insolvency jurisdiction for all group members. The latter touches on the 
insolvency jurisdictional rule-Center of main interest (CoMI) in the EU regulation on 
insolvency proceeding recast 2015(EIR recast).2A prerequisite basis for procedural 
consolidation is to find group CoMI or move CoMI of subsidiaries to one place. 
The aim of this article is to examine whether procedural consolidation is a reliable 
solution for large MCGs in the EU. It explores this issue in the light of multinational 
enterprise theories especially via a business network perspective. It argues that there is 
an inherent difficulty for procedural consolidation to achieve preservation of group 
value and certainty at the same time, as one main part of MCGs' value is obtained by 
allocating head office functions to subsidiaries. The conclusion is that procedural 
consolidation may only be applied in very limited cases and it is not a reliable solution 
for MCGs.  
2. The theoretical underpinning of procedural consolidation
Procedural consolidation means that subsidiaries belonging to the same insolvent MCGs 
can open their insolvency proceedings in ideally just one court.3Arguably, the benefit of 
2 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings (recast) 
3 Irit Mevorach, ‘Appropriate Treatment of Corporate Groups in Insolvency: A Universal View’, (2007) 
European Business Organization Law Review 8 p189 
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it is to preserve the group value and to avoid additional cost arising from multiple 
insolvency proceedings which are otherwise opened. As a solution for the cross-border 
insolvency of MCGs aiming to preserve group value, one can argue that procedural 
consolidation can trace its purposes from both cross-border insolvency law and 
corporate rescue law: maximization of value and certainty.  
 
The corporate rescue law is built around a concept named going concern value.4It is 
generally believed that going concern value may exist only when a company is kept 
intact and running.5 In other words, an operating company may worth more intact than 
if it is broken up.6Therefore, releasing going concern value is in the interests of all the 
creditors and stakeholders.7Also, it is believed that insolvency law should respect 
non-insolvency law as a baseline, as alteration of non-insolvency law inside insolvency 
proceedings will provide stakeholders with incentives to conduct strategic behaviour 
thereby giving rise to the cost of insolvency8and the high cost of borrowing interest 
rate.9This is the certainty requirement pursued by corporate rescue law. 
 
                                                          
4Going-concern value is the value of a company as an ongoing entity. This value differs from the whole 
value of a liquidated company's assets, because an ongoing operation has the ability to continue to earn 
profit, while a liquidated company does not. At 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/going_concern_value.asp 
5 Douglas G. Baird, 'Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms' (1998-1999)108 Yale L.J. 573 p577 
6 Douglas G Baird and Robert K Rasmussen, 'the end of bankruptcy' (2002) 55 Stan L rev 751 p758 
7The rationale behind corporate rescue procedures, such as CVA or administration procedure in UK 
insolvency act is to release the going concern value of the potential business. London Department of trade 
and industry review (2000) p5 
8 Thomas H. Jackson, The logic and limits of bankruptcy law (Harvard university press 1986) p21; 
Douglas G. Baird, 'Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren' (1987)54 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 815  p825 
9 See general Alan Schwartz, 'A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy' (2005) Faculty Scholarship 
Series. Paper 303; Yaad Rotem, 'Pursuing Preservation of Pre-Bankruptcy Entitlements: Corporate 
Bankruptcy Law's Self-Executing Mechanisms' (2008) 5 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 79  
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Cross-border insolvency law theory territorialism10and universalism11also acknowledge 
the goals of value maximization and certainty. The two main cross-border insolvency 
theories hold different views on the means of allocation insolvency jurisdiction. 
Territorialism argues that international insolvency cases should be regulated by courts 
whichever possess the assets of the debtors. The consequence is that more than one 
court is entitled to open insolvency proceedings, due to scattered assets in various 
countries. Universalism argues that ideally, there should be one court and one set of 
insolvency law to be applied to one cross-border insolvency case. It is generally 
believed that universalism has advantages over territorialism due to it can serve the 
goals of value maximization and certainty of rules better. Since one multinational 
company technically may have assets in every country in the EU, the multiple 
insolvency proceedings may stymie the possibility of rescue plans. Also, creditors incur 
more costs to monitor the movement of assets, as it is easier to transfer assets abroad 
                                                          
10Lynn LoPucki, 'Cooperation in international bankruptcy: a post universalist approach'(1998-1999) 84 
Cornell L. Rev. 696; Lynn LoPucki, 'The case for cooperative territoriality in international bankruptcy' 
(1999-2000) 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2216; Frederick Tung, ‘Is international bankruptcy possible?’ (2001-2002) 
23 Mich. J. Int'l L. 31; Lynn LoPucki, 'Universalism unravels'(2005) 79 Am. Bankr.L.J.143; Lynn 
LoPucki, 'Global and out of control' (2005) 79 Am. Bankr. L.J. 79  
11 Nigel John Howcroft, ‘Universal versus territorial models for cross border insolvency: the theory, the 
practice and the reality that universalism prevails’ (2007-2008) 8 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 366; Jay 
Westbrook, 'Priority conflicts as a barrier to cooperation in multinational insolvencies.'(2008-2009) 27 
Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 869; Jay Westbrook, 'Multinational enterprises in general default: chapter 15, the 
ALI principles, and the EU insolvency regulation'(2002) 76 Am. Bankr. L.J. 1; Jay Westbrook, 'Locating 
the eye of the financial storm'32 Brook. J. Int'l L. 1019; Jay Westbrook, 'Breaking away, local priorities 
and global assets'(2006-2007) 46 Tex. Int'l L. J. 601; Jay Westbrook, 'A global solution to multinational 
default' (1999-2000) 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2276  
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than the whole company. The predictability of insolvency jurisdiction rules is required 
by cross-border debt transactions.12 
 
As above mentioned, universalism allocates insolvency jurisdiction by the unit of a 
company rather than an asset. It has gained support widely in the world and its modified 
version has been adopted by EIR recast 2015 with some compromises.13In this 
regulation, the insolvency jurisdiction of one company is allocated to the court 
possessing the CoMI of that company. CoMI is presumed to be the registered place of 
the company, while ultimately it should correspond to the place where the company 
conduct its non-transient main business and ascertainable to third parties.14  
 
A series of cases shape the development of the concept of CoMI.15It is generally 
believed that CoMI is the place where the head office functions of one company are 
carried out; 16all factors need to be considered when determining CoMI; these factors 
have to be available in public domain and ascertainable to creditors.17Also, the 
mainstream consensus is that every company's CoMI has to be determined in an 
entity-by-entity manner.18Furthermore, that a parent company simply being able to exert 
control over subsidiaries is not adequate to conclude that the subsidiaries' CoMI is in the 
                                                          
12 Samuel L. Bufford. ‘Center of main interests, international insolvency case venue, and equality of 
arms: the Eurofood decision of the European court of justice.’ (2006-2007) 27 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 351  
p381 
13 EIR recast 2015 
14 Virgós-Schmit report at para 75; see EIR recast Article 3 (1) 
15In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] Ch. 508; Re Stanford [2010] EWCA Civ 137; Interedil case [2012] 
B.C.C. 851  
16 Luci Mitchell-Fry, Sarah Lawson, ‘Defining CoMI, where are we now.’ (2012) Corporate Rescue and 
Insolvency, p16 
17In re Stanford International Bank Ltd and another[2010] Bus. L.R. 1270 p21 
18 In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] Ch. 508 para116 
6 
 
place where the parent's CoMI is located.19Creditors’ perception should not be based on 
their respective subjective views. Rather, they should predict the location of CoMI on 
the basis of objective factors available in the public domain. Therefore, such test is still 
an independent and objective test.20 
 
Theoretically, procedural consolidation of the insolvency of MCGs needs to base on 
CoMI rule. However, it can be argued that private parties may decide insolvency 
jurisdiction autonomously by agreeing on an insolvency jurisdiction for the whole 
MCGs. The next section will consider it practicability.   
 
3. Procedural consolidation by free choice of insolvency law 
 
Theoretically, procedural consolidation can be achieved by allowing parties to 
free-choice insolvency jurisdiction or CoMI. This section only concerns the former 
situation. 
 
Free choice insolvency law provides that members of companies make the choice at the 
time of incorporation, and the choice could be changed later with creditors’ consent.21In 
the case of MCGs, it is possible that many subsidiaries choose the same jurisdiction as 
the insolvency jurisdiction so as to achieve procedural consolidation. In terms of 
                                                          
19 In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] Ch. 508 para112 
20Federico M. Mucciarelli, ‘Private international law rules in the Insolvency Regulation Recast: a reform 
or a restatement of the status quo?’ (2015) available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2650414  p11 
21 Robert K Rasmussen. ‘A new approach to transnational insolvency’ (1997-1998)19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1  
p5 
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free-choice of insolvency law, there are constraints on the application of procedural 
consolidation: collective nature of insolvency law and differing member states' 
insolvency law. 
 
Free choice of insolvency law will interrupt the collective nature of insolvency law. The 
insolvency of one debtor influences all its creditors together, so insolvency law aims to 
provide a collective solution to all the affected parties.22 This is partly because 
non-insolvency law does not prescribe how to resolve collective issues faced by 
insolvency law, issues regarding how to protect different stakeholders and how to 
distribute assets are of a collective nature which cannot be answered by non-insolvency 
law.23Also, without collective solutions, courts cannot obtain the necessary information 
regarding whether it is correct to save the business, as creditors go to different courts to 
resolve their general disputes.24The collective nature means that it is desirable to apply 
one country's insolvency law as an integration rather than sourcing insolvency 
provisions from different countries.  
 
                                                          
22 In general see Ian Fletcher, The law of insolvency, (4th Edition Sweet & Maxwell London 2009) 
23Douglas G. Baird 'Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A 
Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy' (1984) 51 University of Chicago 
Law Review 97.p103; Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, 'Bankruptcy law for productivity' (2002) 37 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. 51  p92 
24For example, tort law may offer victims entitlement to compensation, however, such rules does not 
indicate how much compensation a victim could expect when the company is insolvent. To regulate such 
issue, tort law has to create a new section titled compensation where debtor is insolvent. As a result, such 
insolvency section could also be seen as part of insolvency substantive law. It does not make too much 
difference to put such insolvency section of tort law under tort law or insolvency law. 
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Another point worth mentioning is that corporate rescue law is in reality complex and 
elastic.25Whereas German insolvency law may focus more on debt collection, French 
insolvency law focuses more on social goals such as employment protection.26The same 
creditors in different member states may be treated differently. The best example is the 
different priority rankings of creditors in different member states' insolvency law. One 
creditor may be in the top ranking under local insolvency law, while he may be demoted 
to the second or even lower ranking under another country’s insolvency law.  
 
Imagining one creditor under the insolvency law of country A may enjoy certain priority 
that he would not enjoy under the insolvency law of country B. If creditors of one 
company but from different countries all argue that they should be treated according to 
their own countries' priority, no priority of ranking can be agreed and formed. As a 
result, the collectivity nature of insolvency law generally requires only one set of rules 
being applied to insolvency cases. The implication of this is that insolvency 
jurisdictional rules are to a large extent tied together with the choice of law rules. Where 
one court is entitled to seize jurisdiction, it could apply its own insolvency law to the 
given case.  
 
EIR recast reflects this idea by incorporating a set of harmonized insolvency choice of 
                                                          
25 Elizabeth Warren 'Bankruptcy Policy' (1987) 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775 p777, p811 
26 Horst Eidenmüller, 'Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law' (2016) European Corporate Governance 
Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 319 p10 
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law rules.27The law of the court will decide the conditions of the opening of those 
proceedings, their conduct and their closure; also it decides many important aspects of 
bankruptcy law such as creditors' priority.28To protect the local interests, the regulation 
also provides certain exceptions to lexi fori concursus.29As a result, when procedural 
consolidation is considered by pulling other insolvent subsidiaries in front of the court 
of another jurisdiction, the consequence may be that certain creditors' rights are 
modified unfairly and unpredictably. 
Also one cannot ignore the interaction of insolvency law and other laws in one country. 
Insolvency law closely connects to employment law, corporate governance and secured 
credit law.30Allowing parties to opt for another country's insolvency before insolvency 
proceeding will break such interaction; also, parties may not be familiar with the chosen 
foreign law.31 
 
A reason based on impracticability to refuse procedural consolidation is that procedural 
consolidation also requires all the countries to accept free choice of insolvency law 
regimes. Currently, no countries allow participants to decide jurisdiction and choice of 
law beforehand even if negatively affected creditors are compensated; in some cases, 
one member state provides creditors with not just a monetary priority but also a strong 
protection involving judicial intervention so that monetary repayment alone cannot 
                                                          
27EIR recast Article 7 See comments on previous EIR HICOL in general: Bob Wessels, International 
insolvency law, (Kluwer The Netherlands 2006) 
28EIR recast Article 7(2) 
29EIR recast Article 8-article 18 
30For the interaction between insolvency law and corporate governance, see John Armour, Brian R. 
Cheffins, David A. Skeel, Jr. ‘Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: 
Lessons from the United Kingdom’ (2002) 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1699  p1701 
31Gerard McCormack, Secured credit and the harmonisation of law, the UNCITRAL experience. (Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited 2011) p49 
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make a local court give up jurisdiction.32Further, without insolvency, it may be difficult 
to find one country whose insolvency law is the best option for all foreign subsidiaries 
with considerable different demand. Also, the complexity and inflexibility make 
companies costly and difficult to change chosen insolvency law.33 
 
Another drawback is that influential creditors may choose insolvency law that benefits 
only for themselves while bypassing the protection offered to the non-adjusting 
creditors or stakeholders. Non-adjusting creditors such as tort creditors who cannot 
bargain for their payment will become victims since senior creditors can externalize loss 
to them.34Debtors and senior adjusting creditors may choose haven countries to 
preclude non-adjusting creditors from claiming money. For example, high petition fees 
discourage creditors with small claims to join in the insolvency proceedings.35The 
number and size of non-adjusting creditors' claims may not be ignorable.36Unsecured 
claims pervasively exist in most of the cases and account for a considerable portion of 
unsecured claims.37  
 
One may argue that a consensus regarding which insolvency law will be chosen may be 
difficult to achieve due to the number of creditors involved; the multiple bankruptcy law 
options give rise to transaction costs to negotiate an agreement.38The cost to conclude 
                                                          
32John A. E. Pottow, ‘A New Role for Secondary Proceedings in International Bankruptcies’ (2010-2011) 
46 Tex. Int'l L. J. 579  p588 
33Gerard McCormack ‘Jurisdictional competition and forum shopping in insolvency proceedings’ (2009) 
The Cambridge Law Journal, 68 p178 
34Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘A global solution to multinational default’ (1999-2000) 98 Mich. L. Rev. 
2276  p2305 
35Lynn. Lopucki, ‘The case for cooperative territoriality in international bankruptcy’ (1999-2000) 98 
Mich. L. Rev. 2216 p2247 
36Robert K. Rasmussen, ‘Resolving transnational insolvency through private ordering’ (1999-2000) 98 
Mich. L. Rev. 2252 p2273 
37Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook, 'Contracting out of bankruptcy: an empirical intervention' 
(2004-2005)118 Harv. L. Rev. 1197 p1245 
38 ibid p1249 
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such contracts would be very high, as every creditor needs to analyze and understand 
the chosen law and efficiency of the court chosen so as to calculate the risks therein, 
even where the firm is very healthy.39Free choice of insolvency law is likely to 
introduce heavy transaction costs as it does not offer an efficient disclosure system to 
inform creditors to which insolvency law they will subject.40All these transaction costs 
will increase in the context of cross-border insolvency of MCGs, as more creditors are 
expected to join in the process of contracts negotiation. Therefore, procedural 
consolidation may more practicably be achieved by means of CoMI. 
 
4. The puzzle of group CoMI 
Since the last section reveals of the drawbacks of procedural consolidation achieved by 
free choice of insolvency law, this section deals with the question whether procedural 
consolidation can rely on the basis of CoMI. 
 
It is obvious that EIR recast does not provide the concept of group CoMI. The benefit of 
centralizing insolvency proceedings of group members into one jurisdiction (in most 
cases, the parent’s jurisdiction) have long been recognized.41This requires one to find a 
joint group CoMI so that one court could deal with the cross-border insolvency for an 
entire group. The main reason to employ this concept is to centrally control the 
insolvency proceedings and to maximize the recovery of corporate group insolvency for 
creditors due to the higher likelihood of successful insolvency reorganization.42It is 
                                                          
39Lynn Lopucki 'Cooperation in international bankruptcy: a post-universalist approach' (1998-1999) 84 
Cornell l rev. 696  p739 
40Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘A global solution to multinational default’ (1999-2000) 98 Mich. L. Rev. 
2276 p2306 
41Samuel L. Bufford, 'Coordination of Insolvency Cases for International Enterprise Groups: A 
Proposal'(2012) 86 Am. Bankr. L.J. 685  p711 
42Irit Mevorach, 'The "home country" of a multinational enterprise group facing insolvency' (2008) 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly, p8 
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correct to note that modern global business may be conducted in a cross-division way in 
the corporate group rather than in an entity-by-entity way. That is to say that the 
business integration of group members may not be served well by traditional insolvency 
law, especially in corporate rescue situations.43Under this situation, one court can 
administer the group insolvency without the need to design new provisions specific for 
group insolvency.44 
 
This thread of suggestions in regard to procedural consolidation is mainly built on the 
existing CoMI concept.45It is one thing to recognise the seeming desirability of 
procedural consolidation based on group CoMI; it is another thing to determine under 
what circumstances can one say with confidence that one given group can be 
procedurally consolidated. The business-integrated and control-centralized corporate 
groups may be difficult to define and they may not be the majority of the types of 
corporate groups. It is possible for a corporate group to encompass more than one entity 
which performs the head office functions. Under such circumstance, it is far-fetch to 
argue there is a joint group CoMI. The next section will consider whether group CoMI 
                                                          
43Gabriel Moss, Christoph G. Paulus, ' The European Insolvency Regulation - the case for urgent reform'  
(2006) Insolvency Intelligence p5 
44ibid p5 
45 See Irit Mevorach, 'The "home country" of a multinational enterprise group facing insolvency' (2008) 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly, p8 (says that just as CoMI is the place where the head office 
functions are carried out, the same may apply to corporate groups, i.e. the place where the head office 
function is centrally carried out and controlled.) Ralph R. Mabey Susan Power Johnston, 'Coordination 
among insolvency courts in the rescue of multinational enterprises'  (2008) 34th Lawrence P. King & 
Charles Seligson Workshop on Bankruptcy and Business Reorganization New York University School of 
Law; see also Samuel L. Bufford, 'Coordination of Insolvency Cases for International Enterprise Groups: 
A Proposal' (2012) 86 Am. Bankr. L.J. 685 p716 (says that one may suggest that the group CoMI concept 
could free-ride the development of CoMI, and group CoMI can be defined as the location where the 
group collectively organizes and manages its interests and is perceptible to third parties. Such a place 
corresponds to the place where the group’s actual head office functions are carried out.) Edward J. Janger, 
‘Virtual territoriality’ (2009-2010) 48 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 401p434; Robert W. Miller, ‘Economic 
integration: An American solution to the multinational corporate group conundrum.’ (2011-2012)11 Rich. 
J. Global L. & Bus. 185  p213-214 
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could be easily identified under its current definition through the lens of a business 
network perspective. 
 
5. A business network perspective of procedural consolidation 
Procedural consolidation needs to preserve the value of MCGs while respecting the 
CoMI test. However, if there is an inherent contradiction between these two values in 
that group achieve its group going concern value by allocated head office functions 
across group members, the efficacy of procedural consolidation is limited. This section 
will explore this issue in more details. 
 
5.1 Group going concern value of MCGs 
 
European large corporate groups typically operate through the network of subsidiaries.46 
Internalization theory47provides useful insights to explain the boundaries of MCGs. One 
explanation of the raison d'être of traditional hierarchical MCGs is that internalization 
of certain activities inside the MCGs reduces costs that would otherwise arise in arm's 
length transaction in the market. In other words, the imperfection of markets causes 
MCGs to locate some of the business activities inside a group whereby the transaction 
cost could be reduced.48 Since the relationships among group members are different to 
and superior to arm's length market relationships, MCGs use control to connect 
                                                          
46Commission staff working document executive summary of the impact assessment- accompanying the 
document-commission recommendation on a new approach to business failure and insolvency SWD(2014) 
61 final p20 
47 Alan M. Rugman, 'Reconciling Internalization Theory and the Eclectic Paradigm' (2009) v18 (1)The 
multinational business review; Peter J. Buckley and Roger Strange, 'The Governance of the Multinational 
Enterprise: Insights from Internalization Theory' (2011) Journal of Management Studies 48 2  
48Michael Galanis, 'Vicious spirals in corporate governance: mandatory rules for systemic (Re)balance?' 
(2011) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2  p331; see also Ronald Coase, ‘The Nature of the 
Firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 386–405. 
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members together. 
 
EIR recast reflects this the control test by providing that: ‘parent undertaking’ means an 
undertaking which controls, either directly or indirectly, one or more subsidiary 
undertakings.49Control could be obtained by a certain percentage of shareholdings or 
votes either directly or indirectly; or by a functional means such as ownership or 
contracts.50Therefore, MCGs will expand their business to other countries if they can 
gain more net benefits from managing the interdependent relationships between 
different subsidiaries than can the market.51This indicates that the relationships of group 
member companies in an MCG may be of great value.  
 
This article believes that the value of relationships may consist of a large part of 'group 
going concern value'. It is generally believed that going concern value52may exist only 
when a company is kept intact and running.53In other words, an operating company may 
be worth more intact than if it is broken up.54It is believed that the going concern value 
of a business is much larger than the piece meal value in liquidation proceedings; 
therefore, releasing going concern value is in the interests of all the creditors and 
                                                          
49 EIR recast 2015 Art. 2 
50UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law—Part three p15 
51 Jean-Francois Hennart 'Theories of the multinational enterprise' in Alan M. Rugman, The Oxford 
handbook of international business (2nd Edition OUP 2009) p133 
52 See definition of going concern value: Going-concern value is the value of a company as an ongoing 
entity. This value differs from the value of a liquidated company's assets, because an ongoing operation 
has the ability to continue to earn profit, while a liquidated company does not. At 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/going_concern_value.asp 
53 Douglas G. Baird, 'Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms' (1998-1999)108 Yale L.J. 573 p577 
54Douglas G Baird and Robert K Rasmussen, 'The end of bankruptcy' (2002)55 Stan L rev 751 p758 
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stakeholders.55By analogy, the group going concern value can be defined as the value 
that only exists when most of the internal business relationships among group member 
companies are kept intact. Keeping the group intact is to a large extent to keep the 
relationships intact. 
 
This argument can be further supported by resource-based theory and knowledge-based 
theory. They provide that in order to succeed in the market, companies should possess 
rare, valuable, non-substitutable and inimitable resources to gain advantages.56These 
valuable resources are not confined to valuable physical assets, but also include the 
knowledge to use resources and conduit to obtain knowledge and external 
opportunities.57That is to say, the knowledge and capacities to obtain resources are key 
for MCGs to gain advantages over rivals.58 
 
It is important to note that many important innovations are achieved at the subsidiaries’ 
                                                          
55The rationale behind corporate rescue procedures, such as CVA or administration procedure in UK 
insolvency act is to release the going concern value of the potential business. London Department of trade 
and industry review (2000) p5 
56Examples of valued resources and capabilities include reputation, buyer-supplier relationships, tacit 
knowledge, R&D expertise, and technological capabilities. Jay Barney, ‘Firm resources and sustained 
competitive advantage’ (1991) Journal of Management, 17 99-120. Christine Oliver, 'Sustainable 
Competitive Advantage: Combining Institutional and Resource-Based Views' (1997) Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 18, No. 9  
57Sidney G. Winter, 'On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation,' (1988) Journal of Law, Economics, 
and Organization, 4  p175-177; DJ Teece, G Pisano and A Shuen, 'Firm Capabilities, Resources, 
and the Concept of Strategy,' (1990) Mimeo University of California at Berkeley, Haas School of 
Business. p11; Cyert, R. M, P. Kumar and J. R. Williams (1993), 'Information, Market Imperfections and 
Strategy,' Strategic Management Journal, Winter Special Issue, 14 p57; see generally, Kathleen R. Conner 
and C. K. Prahalad, 'A Resource-based Theory of the Firm' Knowledge Versus Opportunism'  (1996) 
Organization Science/VOI. 7, No.5, 
58Robert M Gant, 'Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm' (1996) Strategic Management Journal, 
Vol. 17  p120 
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levels so that subsidiaries are strategic resources of the MCGs.59 It is not enough to 
perform better than competitors in the global market solely relying on the strength of 
the parent company, so all the subsidiaries should contribute their knowledge learnt 
from the local environment to the MCGs.60In fact, foreign subsidiaries have better 
access to the information and country-specific advantages, such as technology and low 
cost of labour. The business relationships among group members allow other group 
members to understand the foreign environment and demand; learn and share with each 
other.61The group can locate subsidiaries to gain local advantage and transform the 
country-related advantages into firm-specific advantages, and transfer them to other 
subsidiaries.62That is to say, business networks are the pipes of information, resources, 
technologies and marketing between member companies, and they could be seen as 
important intangible resources of companies.63This network may be cut off by 
fragmented and uncooperative insolvency proceedings initiated in different member 
states. 
                                                          
59Francesco Ciabuschi, Ulf Holm, Oscar Martin Martin 'Dual embeddedness, influence and performance 
of innovating subsidiaries in the multinational corporation' (2014) International Business Review 23  
p897 
60 Yves DOZ, Jose F.P. & Santos ' On the management of knowledge: from the transparency of 
collocation and co-setting to the quandary of dispersion and differentiation' INSEAD, Fontainebleau, 
France.p6 
61 Francesco Ciabuschi, Ulf Holm and Oscar Martin Martin 'Dual embeddedness, influence and 
performance of innovating subsidiaries in the multinational corporation'(2014) International Business 
Review 23 p905 
62Ulf Andersson, Henrik Dellestrand, Torben Pedersen, 'The Contribution of local environments to 
competence creation in multinational enterprises' Long Range Planning 47 (2014) p95 
63Mats Forsgren, Theories of the multinational firm, (Second edition, Edward Elgar publishing limited 
UK  2013) p108 
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From the above, one may argue that the relationships among members of MCGs may 
form group going concern value that should be preserved in cross-border insolvency. 
The next question is whether the value could be preserved by procedural consolidation 
on the basis of CoMI. This begs the question how the head office functions are allocated 
within MCGs as CoMI is the place where the head office functions of one company are 
carried out. 
 
5.2 The allocation of head office functions inside MCGs 
 
Business network perspective provides useful insights of the allocation of control in 
MCGs.64It focuses on the perspective of individual subsidiaries. The main tenet is that 
every subsidiary can be viewed as living in many idiosyncratic business networks 
consisting of internal and external fragmented environments.65Since the networks that 
one subsidiary formed either with internal group members or external partners in the 
market are of great value,66parent company's control on that subsidiary is contingent on 
                                                          
64Mats Forsgren and others, 'Managing the embedded multinational--a business network view', (2006) 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK; Bernard Surlemont, 'A typology of centers within multinational 
corporations: an empirical investigation' in Julian Birkinshaw, Neil Hood, Multinational Corporate 
evolution and subsidiary development, (Macmillan press London 1998); Mats Forsgren, Theories of the 
multinational firm, (Second edition, Edward Elgar publishing limited UK 2013); Ulf Andersson, Mats 
Forsgren and Ulf Holm, ' Balancing Subsidiary Influence in the Federative MNC: A Business Network 
View' (2007) Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 38, No. 5; Håkan Håkansson and Ivan 
Snehota, 'Developing Relationships in Business Networks', (1995) Routledge London; Kirsten Foss and 
others, 'MNC organisational form and subsidiary motivation problems: controlling intervention hazards in 
the network of MNC'(2011) available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969402 
65Mats Forsgren, Theories of the multinational firm, (Second edition, Edward Elgar publishing limited 
UK  2013) p107 
66Networks may form relational economic rents which cannot be gained by regular market relationships. 
Jeffrey H. Dyer and Harbir Singh, 'The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of 
Inter-organizational Competitive Advantage' (1998) The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 23, 
p662 
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the power of the overall networks of that subsidiary.67From resource dependence theory, 
the parent has to rely on their resources as it cannot understand how to properly use 
these resources without the facilitation of subsidiaries. As a result, the subsidiaries could 
use these resources to obtain power and autonomy in certain areas of decision-making 
irrespective of the desire of parent. In other words, certain subsidiaries' strategies 
derived from their networks will counterbalance the control from the parent company.68 
 
This especially true as subsidiaries' roles are changing and expanding from a local 
implementer of the parent company to the roles which are in charge of certain 
technological and business related resources such as R&D and marketing.69Even though 
parent companies may acquire control through their ownership,70they may not exert 
their control. The pre-condition to exert control is that the parent company needs to 
make sure that its allocation of resources to one company does not harm the 
opportunities of other subsidiaries.71A parent company therefore needs to balance its 
control on subsidiaries and subsidiaries' control on other subsidiaries and the parent 
itself. This does not deny the existence of and the importance of the hierarchical 
structure of MCGs, but in reality, the control in MCGs is allocated by bundles of 
idiosyncratic and heterogeneous business networks rather than institutional 
                                                          
67 Mats Forsgren, Theories of the multinational firm, (Second edition, Edward Elgar publishing limited 
UK  2013) p108 p118-119 
68Mats Forsgren, et al, managing the embedded multinational--a business network view, (Edward Elgar, 
cheltenham UK 2006) p133 
69Ram Mudambi et al 'How subsidiaries gain power in multinational corporations' (2014) Journal of 
World Business 49  p109 
70For instance, one holding company stay at the apex of the whole group, or in chain style shareholding 
where the head of the chain owns the majority of shares of its subsidiary, and in turn the subsidiary owns 
majority of shares of its sub-unit. Bob Tricker, Corporate governance principles, policies, and practices 
(Oxford university press 2009) p76 
71 Mo Yamin, Ulf Andersson 'Subsidiary importance in the MNC: What role does internal embeddedness 
play?' (2011) International Business Review 20  p153 
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hierarchies.72 
 
Research has shown that relatively decentralised subsidiaries are more likely to learn 
and create value.73The relatively decentralised decision-making mandate allows 
subsidiaries to adapt to the local environment and respond to the exigencies quickly. By 
contrast, a hierarchical and centralised corporate group may not be able to cope with 
more and more complex environments and win in a fierce competition.74All this 
encourages international companies not to adopt a pure centralised and integrated 
business form of group, as it prevents the subsidiaries from learning from their 
environments and from contributing the group. As a result, parent companies need to 
allow certain subsidiaries to retain decision-making power in the areas where they have 
valuable expertise. Therefore, there may be more than one head office in a given MCG 
with different head office functions spread across different levels. 
 
One thing worth mentioning is that CoMI location analysis entails a comprehensive 
consideration of all relevant factors. Therefore, even though in some cases, parent 
companies can control the financial arrangements of all the subsidiaries, one cannot 
conclude that parent companies have ultimate control of subsidiaries. Put briefly, certain 
subsidiaries may control the research and development function which is at least equally 
important as the financial function. In fact, one research shows that technology-related 
head office functions can arguably yield the strongest control.75As a result, focusing on 
                                                          
72 Mats Forsgren, Theories of the multinational firm, (Second edition, Edward Elgar publishing limited 
UK  2013) p116 
73 Kirsten Foss et al, 'MNC organisational form and subsidiary motivation problems: controlling 
intervention hazardsin the network of MNC'(2011) available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969402 p6 
74 Kirsten Foss et al, 'MNC organisational form and subsidiary motivation problems: controlling 
intervention hazardsin the network of MNC'2011 available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969402 p6 
75Ram Mudambi et al 'How subsidiaries gain power in multinational corporations' Journal of World 
Business 49 (2014) p109 
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only finance-related factors run against the principles of case law which requires a 
comprehensive analysis of all objective factors that are ascertainable to creditors.76It is 
more likely that the idiosyncratic and heterogeneous business networks of each 
subsidiary in one group confer every subsidiary different head office functions so that 
no clear group CoMI of that group can be found. 
 
With the above finding in mind, the next section will consider how this will affect 
procedural consolidation. 
 
5.3 Problems of procedural consolidation 
At this stage, it is possible to examine whether procedural consolidation offers a good 
solution to the insolvency of MCGs on the basis of CoMI test. Here it is important to 
note one distinction between whether EIR recast allows procedural consolidation and 
whether procedural consolidation can achieve the goals it aims to achieve. Even if EIR 
recast allows procedural consolidation, it does not justify it in all circumstances. 
 
Admitted that in the cases where the subsidiaries' CoMIs are indeed in their parent's 
location and are ascertainable to third parties, relevant insolvency proceedings of 
subsidiaries still could be opened in the place of the parent company.77One well-known 
case regarding procedural consolidation is the Daisytek case78where the parent 
companies Daisytek ISA in the UK opened insolvency proceedings for its sixteen 
subsidiaries in different European member states. The UK court considered the scale 
and importance of the interests of creditors of subsidiaries and the court confirmed that 
                                                          
76 Re Stanford [2010] EWCA Civ 137; Interedil case [2012] B.C.C. 851 
77Heribert Hirte, 'Towards a framework for the regulation of corporate groups' insolvencies'5 ECFR 213 
2008 p220;see also Christoph Paulus, "Group Insolvencies - Some Thoughts about New Approaches", 
(2007) 42 Texas Int'l L.J. p819-820 
78Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd [2004] B.P.I.R. 30. 
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the UK was the place of CoMI of all those European subsidiaries.79One can also argue 
that EIR recast still allows procedural consolidation.80However, this says nothing about 
whether procedural consolidation can offer a good balance between preservation of 
group going concern value and certainty. 
 
One should not assume that all the courts may seize insolvency jurisdiction in good 
faith by conducting a CoMI analysis for all subsidiaries.81It has been argued that the 
insolvency courts be biased to decide CoMI or even compete for the insolvency 
jurisdiction; the courts are more likely to act in favour of managers and other allies 
rather than the unsecured creditors.82As big cases are usually lucrative, the courts and 
insolvency practitioners cannot be expected to give them up to other jurisdictions.83 
 
We can also witness that some scholars call for attaching great importance to registered 
place test by making it difficult to be rebutted.84This is the emphasis of the goal of 
certainty in cross-border insolvency law context.85Back to the Daisytek case, though it 
seems that English court conducted a procedural consolidation based on CoMIs analysis 
                                                          
79Hon. Samuel L. Bufford, 'International insolvency case venue in the European Union: the Parmalat and 
Daisytek controversies' (2005-2006) 12 Colum. J. Eur. L. 429  p457 
80 Michele Reumers, 'What is in a Name? Group Coordination or Consolidation Plan—What is Allowed 
Under 
the EIR Recast?' (2016) Int. Insolv. Rev. Vol. 25  
81Matteo M. Winkler, From Whipped Cream to Multibillion Euro Financial Collapse: The European 
Regulation on Transnational Insolvency in Action' (2008) 26 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 352  p369 
82 Lynn M. LoPucki, Courting failure: How Competition for Big Cases is Corrupting the Bankruptcy 
Courts  (The University of Michigan Press 2006) p243 
83ibid p221 
84Gerard McCormack, ‘COMI and comity in UK and US insolvency law’ (2012) Law Quarterly Review, 
p7; Dario Latella, 'The "COMI" Concept in the Revision of the European Insolvency Regulation' (2014) 
European Company and Financial Law Review 11(4) p479-494 
85Jay L. Westbrook 'Locating the eye of the financial storm' (2006-2007) 32 Brook. J. Int'l L. 1019  
p1032 
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for all companies involved, 86there is no uniform standard of the analysis. Which factors 
should be given more weight when considering CoMI? And how many factors in one 
location can determine CoMI? 
 
Only in the MCGs whose business are neatly centrally controlled and integrated, 87it is 
possible to achieve similar results like Daisytek case. However, business network 
perspective of MCGs shows an inherent contradiction between group going concern 
value and the allocation of head office functions. That is, the group going concern value 
is achieved by means of spreading head office functions across subsidiaries. Based on 
current understanding of CoMI, procedural consolidation may not preserve group going 
concern value by pulling other subsidiaries into one jurisdiction on the one hand and 
provide certainty to local creditors who may well percept that the local subsidiaries are 
undertaking certain head office functions on the other hand. Procedural consolidation 
changes the applicable law to those creditors, so even though a centralized group rescue 
plan can bring a larger pie to creditors, the uncertainty caused by such practice may give 
rise to an increase of interest rate to the society.  
 
It is true that creditors or debtors may move CoMI to one country for the purpose of 
procedural consolidation. Using forum shopping as a method to achieve procedural 
consolidation is dangerous for several reasons. The foremost one is that when forum 
shopping  happens at operating companies' level, it may destroy group going concern 
value. From a business network perspective, the relationships between subsidiaries and 
their external environment are the main component of the group going concern value of 
MCGs. Part of the group going concern value is gained through the foreign subsidiaries 
as they can absorb foreign countries' specific advantages. The movement of real CoMI 
                                                          
86Gabriel Moss QC, ‘Group insolvency-forum-EC Regulation and model law under the influence of 
English pragmatism revisited’ (2014-2015) 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 179  p186 
87Irit Mevorach , ‘Cross border insolvency law of enterprise groups: the choice of law challenge’ (2014) 9 
Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 107  p6 
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may change the environment where foreign subsidiaries are embedded and cut off their 
conduits to gain foreign resources and capacities. As a result, a transfer of real CoMI 
means that foreign subsidiaries cannot transform the advantages of foreign countries 
into the group going concern value, as their business locations have been changed. 
These transferred subsidiaries cannot transform the country-specific resources into 
company-specific resources and transfer these value to the MNCs. The decrease of the 
value as a result of a forum shopping may outweigh the cost saved by procedural 
consolidation. 
 
When procedural consolidation via forum shopping happens at holding level, the 
problems of above may dwindle.88Holding companies may only have institutional 
secured creditors to take care and more importantly, they do not have a complicated 
location-bound external environment. In fact, it has been seen some MCGs insolvency 
cases happened at holding levels, especially involving the pre-pack sale of operating 
companies.89 
 
However, certain foreign insolvency law procedures such as pre-pack administrations 
may benefit senior creditors at the expense of junior ones.90The Wind Hellas case is an 
example of forum shopping for the purpose of making use of UK pre-pack 
administration and schemes of arrangement. This is also the case involve procedural 
                                                          
88 Jennifer Payne, Scheme of arrangement, Theory structure and operation, (Cambridge University Press 
2014) p322 
89 In the Matter of Christophorus 3 Limited, [2014] EWHC 1162 (Ch); Barclays Bank Plc v HHY 
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consolidation as six companies in the group transferred CoMIs to the UK.91The result 
attracted heavy criticism as it left the unsecured creditors with 1.5 billion Euros 
unpaid.92The motive of the senior creditors moving companies to the UK may be 
suspicious as it can be said to going around the contractual protection to junior creditors 
provided by inter-creditor agreement. 93This change dramatically modified junior 
creditors' expectations and the drawbacks of the flexible restructuring law, such as 
pre-pack, could be released if it was not used properly. The whole process was also 
suspiciously rigged by debtors, since some information was only available to the 
successful bidder but not to others.94Therefore, procedural consolidation by forum 
shopping should be subject to close scrutiny. Also, as above-mentioned, if it happens at 
the level of operating companies, the result may be far more harmful. 
 
It seems a better direction of development is to design debt restructuring rules to 
facilitate MCGs reaching rearrangements with senior creditors at the holding 
companies' level while keeping the operating subsidiaries intact. The aim is to avoid 
group-wide insolvency or at least allow the operating group to be transferred to new 
buyers without the need of forum shopping. Nonetheless, this solution needs to make 
sure that insolvency jurisdiction is respected and adequate protection is granted to junior 
financial creditors.  
 
                                                          
91Hellas III, Hellas IV, Hellas V, Hellas VI are all holding companies in the group which bear debt and 
obligation of guarantees stipulated in the same inter-creditor agreement. 
92M Rustein, L Bloomberg, ‘A wind blow through an English brothel’. (2010) CRI P156 
93Inter-creditor agreement does not allow security agents to release principal and interests of 
inter-company debts between Wind Hellas and other holding companies. See Christian Pilkington and 
others, ‘Wind Hellas a complex restructuring in global recession’ (2011) Practical Law Publishing 
Limited. 
94Re Hellas Telecommunications [2009] EWHC 3199 (Ch) p5 
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6 Conclusion 
As the above analysis indicates, procedural consolidation may contain inherent 
drawbacks in solving cross-border insolvency issues for MCGs. Though cost may be 
reduced by centralizing the insolvency proceedings of subsidiaries to their ultimate 
parent’s one, the cost from the uncertainty may outweigh the benefits of centralization. 
Among other things, the main difficulty arises from the fact that MCGs achieve an 
important part of their group going concern value by spreading head office functions 
across member companies, which cripples the basis of procedural consolidation in that 
it may not achieve preservation of value and certainty at the same time.  
